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I. Introduction 
In Mary Shelley’s masterpiece of Gothic horror, Frankenstein, 
the monster stumbles across the diary of his maker, the titular Dr. 
Frankenstein.1 With Shelley’s profound vocabulary, the monster 
proclaims his sadness upon reading what his creator has written 
about him: 
Everything is related . . . which bears reference to my accursed 
origin; the whole detail of that series of disgusting 
circumstances which produced it is set in view; the minutest 
description of my odious and loathsome person is given, in 
language which painted your own horrors and rendered mine 
indelible. I sickened as I read. “Hateful day when I received 
life!” I exclaimed in agony. “Accursed creator! Why did you form 
a monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust? 
God, in pity, made man beautiful and alluring, after his own 
image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even 
from the very resemblance.”2 
When faced with this account of his creation, Frankenstein’s 
monster came to fully understand his nature: he was the 
regrettable result of the aspirations of his maker. In piecing 
together remnants of corpses to create life on his own terms, Dr. 
Frankenstein created a monster; this monster was unfit to live 
among the rest of humanity, and infused the world around it with 
                                                                                                     
 1. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 185–86 (Watermill Press 1980) (1831). 
 2. Id.  
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horror rather than beauty.3 Of the many unfortunate lessons in 
Shelley’s novel, this is among the most profound: humanity is rife 
with hubris, but the hubristic are bound to fail when they rewrite 
the rules.4 
A. The Complete Bar Order: A Legal Frankenstein’s Monster 
In much the same way that Victor Frankenstein pulled pieces 
from burial grounds and charnel houses to assemble his creation, 
the courts have, in recent years, pulled precepts from various legal 
arenas—bankruptcy, securities law, and equity—to create a legal 
Frankenstein’s monster, in the form of the “Complete Bar Order.”5 
At its most basic level, a bar order (of any kind) is an order of writ 
that forbids a party from suing.6 Where traditionally courts have 
limited a bar order to crossclaims and counterclaims between 
parties before the court in securities fraud litigation, this new legal 
creature rewrites long-accepted rules of due process and open 
access to the courts by effectively and permanently barring any 
and all claims by parties not even before the court.7 
                                                                                                     
 3. Id. 
 4. See David Lemberg, The Hubris of Dr. Frankenstein and Reproductive 
Cloning, ALBANY MED. C. (July 7, 2011), http://www.amc.edu/BioethicsBlog/ 
post.cfm/the-hubris-of-dr-frankenstein-and-reproductive-cloning (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2017) (“Prometheus and Frankenstein shared the classical tragic flaw of 
hubris.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. I use this term (Complete Bar Order) throughout the Note to describe a 
bar order that works to bar any and all claims against a moving party, including 
the claims of a non-party to the case. The term “Complete Bar Order” has also 
been used to describe bar orders of a more limited scope. See In re Rite Aid Corp. 
Sec. Litig. 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 719 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (designating a bar order 
that barred all claims, even those other than indemnification or contribution, by 
non-settling defendants against the moving party). 
 6. See Robert S. Saunders & Stephen D. Dargitz, Post No Bills: The 11th 
Circuit Extends the 2nd Circuit’s Gerber Standard & Approves Barring 
Advancement Claims in Securities Settlements, 7 Sec. Litig. Rep. 10, 10 (Jan. 
2010) (“A bar order prohibits [parties] from suing settling defendants for 
contribution or related claims.”). 
 7. See Final Bar Order at 8–9, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 
3:09-cv-0298-n (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2016) (“This Court hereby permanently bars, 
restrains, and enjoins the Receiver, the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested 
Parties, and all other Persons or entities anywhere in the 
world, . . . from . . . instituting, reinstituting, intervening in, initiating, 
commencing, maintaining, continuing, filing . . . or otherwise prosecuting [the 
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One example of this new form of bar order—the Complete Bar 
Order—occurred in August of 2016, when the Northern District of 
Texas approved a settlement between the global accounting firm 
BDO USA, LLP (BDO) and various parties suing it for its alleged 
involvement as an aider and abettor in the Stanford Financial 
Ponzi scheme.8 The repercussions of this Complete Bar Order are 
significant, not just in the context of the Stanford litigations, but 
also for securities fraud jurisprudence generally.9 
B. The Stanford Story 
In February 2009, federal agents stormed the Houston offices 
of Stanford Financial Group (Stanford) and froze all its assets.10 
The Northern District Court promptly declared jurisdiction and 
possession of all Stanford assets and appointed an equity receiver 
to liquidate the Stanford companies.11 The receiver would be 
tasked with managing the estate, and would be responsible for 
making claim disbursements to the defrauded investors in the 
Stanford scheme, all under the supervision of the district court.12 
Stanford’s Ponzi scheme was a complex, multi-decade criminal 
enterprise comprising 130 different companies under the Stanford 
brand, which at one point serviced 30,000 customers with billions 
of dollars of invested assets.13 Most of the Stanford enterprise was 
                                                                                                     
settling party].” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., Nos. 3:09-CV-0298-N, 
3:12-CV-01447-N, 2015 WL 10818588, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (approving 
Complete Bar Order). 
 9. See infra notes 10–26 and accompanying text (describing the impact of 
the BDO Bar Order on investors in the Stanford fraud). 
 10. See Anna Driver, U.S. Agents Enter Stanford Financial Houston Office, 
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2009, 12:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-stanford-
marshals-idUSN1736672620090217 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (detailing the raid 
of Stanford offices) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 29, Official Stanford Inv’rs 
Comm. v. BDO USA, LLP, No. 3:12-CV-01447-N, 2014 WL 10748581 (N.D. Tex. 
May 13, 2014) (highlighting the facts surrounding the appointment of the 
Stanford receiver). 
 12. See Amended Order Appointing Receiver at 1–12, SEC V. Stanford Int’l 
Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09–CV–0298–N (Mar. 12, 2009) (appointing and instructing 
receiver in Stanford matter). 
 13. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 11 at 8 (giving the 
history of the Stanford financial enterprise). 
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legitimate, but one Antiguan bank—Stanford International Bank 
Limited (SIBL)—acted as the epicenter of a fraud.14 SIBL offered 
one proprietary product, a certificate of deposit, and Stanford 
would use investment principal into that deposit program to 
further a Ponzi scheme that provided revenue for all its companies 
worldwide.15 
The Stanford receiver, from the outset, instituted a strategy 
that heavily focused on litigation in order to collect funds to 
distribute to the defrauded investors: it would pursue claims 
against third parties, who, allegedly, contributed to the Stanford 
fraud.16 In 2014, the Stanford receiver, an “Investor’s Committee,” 
and a class of defrauded investors all filed separate actions against 
BDO as an aider and abettor.17 The allegations against BDO were 
substantial.18 Various members of the class action considered 
opting out of the class to pursue their own litigation against BDO.19 
In an effort to prevent these opt-outs, and to extinguish all pending 
claims against it, BDO entered into a settlement with the receiver, 
the Investor’s Committee, and the class which hinged on the 
execution of a Complete Bar Order.20 The settlement proposal 
                                                                                                     
 14. See id. at 9, 12–15 (describing the Stanford International Bank and its 
Certificate of Deposit program). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Lauren Kryger, Majority of Funds Recovered in Stanford Ponzi 
Scheme Spent by Receiver, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (October 10, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/10/13515/majority-funds-recovered-
stanford-ponzi-scheme-spent-receiver (last updated May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM) (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2018) (“[The Stanford Receiver] has sued thousands of people . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., Nos. 3:09–CV–0298–N, 3:12–CV–
01447–N, 2015 WL 10818588, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (“This motion arises from a 
compromise reached between parties in three cases . . . the ‘SEC Action’ . . . the 
‘Committee Litigation[,]’ and . . . the ‘Investor Litigation’ . . . .”). 
 18. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, supra note 11 at 30–42 (levying 
various allegations of aiding and abetting including BDO’s involvement in a “task 
force” designed to set up Antigua as a haven and its failure to properly audit in 
the face of suspicion, among other things). 
 19. See Patrick Danner, Stanford Investors Unhappy with BDO’s $40 Million 
Settlement, MY SAN ANTONIO, www.mysanantonio.com/business/local/article/ 
Stanford-investors-unhappy-with-BDO-s-40-6526796.php (last updated Sept. 24, 
2015 10:59 AM) (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (detailing overall dissatisfaction with 
class action settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See Stanford Int’l Bank, 2015 WL 10818588 at *1 (approving settlement 
between BDO, Stanford receiver, Stanford Investor’s Committee, and class). 
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effectively discouraged the potential class action opt-outs from 
executing their opt-out right, and the judge approved the Order.21 
Later, another group of claims surfaced against a different 
alleged aider and abettor in the Stanford fraud, Willis Towers 
Watson, PLC (Willis), and several of its affiliated companies.22 As 
was the case with BDO, the allegations against Willis were 
substantial, and were hurled on three fronts: by the receiver, the 
Investor’s Committee, and a class of defrauded investors.23 This 
time, however, there was a fourth plaintiff group; various investors 
affirmatively elected to opt out of the class in an effort to pursue 
their own litigation.24 In September 2016, Willis, the receiver, the 
Committee, and the class entered a settlement; again, the 
settlement was contingent on the issuance of a Complete Bar 
Order.25 Such an Order would, effectively, bar any recovery for 
investors who exercised their own rights by opting out of the 
                                                                                                     
 21. See id. (approving Complete Bar Order as part of settlement). 
 22. Proposed Final Bar Order at 2, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 
No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2016); see also Motion to Approve 
Proposed Settlement With the Willis Defendants at 3, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 
Ltd, No. 3:09-CV-0298-N, Janvey v. Willis of Colorado, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-03980-N 
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2016) (proposing settlement with Willis for its alleged role as 
a third-party aider and abettor in the Stanford fraud). 
 23. See Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement With the Willis Defendants, 
supra note 22 at 2 (settling claims for “the Receiver, the Committee, and the 
Investor Plaintiffs”). 
 24. See Stanford Ponzi Opt-Outs Sue Insurance Broker, STANFORD INT’L 
VICTIMS GROUP (Sept. 13, 2016), https://sivg.wordpress.com/2016/09/13/stanford-
ponzi-opt-outs-sue-insurance-broker/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (“People with 
$135 million in claims . . . sued Willis Ltd. . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 25. See Motion to Approve Proposed Settlement With the Willis Defendants, 
supra note 22, at 2 (“Plaintiffs further request . . . that the Court enter the 
Scheduling Order, approve the Notices, and enter the Bar Order . . . .”). 
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class.26 The court approved the settlement and granted the 
Complete Bar Order.27 
Courts in securities fraud litigation have signed Complete Bar 
Orders in other jurisdictions as well.28 In 2009, the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the issuance of a Complete Bar Order as part of a 
settlement between the IPOF Fund equity receiver and Ferris, 
Baker Watts Inc. that not only barred claims between non-parties, 
but also barred the claims of the plaintiffs who had actually 
initiated the lawsuit.29 The Ninth Circuit took similar action in an 
earlier securities fraud case by permanently staying all pending 
state-court actions—and all potential actions—in order to allow 
the federally-appointed receiver to take full control of the 
management of the estate.30 
In all of these instances, the supervising judge issued a 
Complete Bar Order to further the interests of an equity receiver 
at the expense of the litigation interests of other parties.31 At the 
heart of this equity action lies the overarching deference afforded 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Proposed Final Bar Order, supra note 22, at 8 (“The Court hereby 
bars, restrains and enjoins the Receiver, the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the 
Interested Parties, and all other Persons or entities . . . from . . . instituting, 
reinstituting, intervening in initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, 
filing, encouraging, soliciting, supporting, participating in, collaborating in, or 
otherwise prosecuting . . . Willis . . . .”). It should be noted that the language in 
the proposed Final Bar Order closely matches the language of the previous 
Complete Bar Orders in Stanford matters, as approved, against both BDO and 
Chadbourne & Park, LLP. See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., Nos. 
3:09-CV-0298-N, 3:12-CV-01447-N, 2015 WL 10818588, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2015) 
(approving Complete Bar Order); Final Bar Order at 8–9, SEC v. Stanford Int’l 
Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n (N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2016) (same). 
 27. Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, No. 3:09-CV-0298-N (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 19, 2016). 
 28. See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (detailing the issuance of 
a Complete Bar Order in the Sixth Circuit and a permanent stay in an earlier 
case in the Ninth Circuit). 
 29. See generally Gordon v. Dadante, 336 F. App’x 540 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming a bar order in a securities fraud case involving an equity receiver). 
 30. See SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the 
court has “inherent equitable authority” to issue “ancillary relief” measures, 
including injunctions to stay proceedings by non-parties, and affirming such an 
injunction). 
 31. See SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 424 F. App’x 338, 341 (5th Cir. 
2011) (per curiam) (affirming indefinite stay on pending or potential litigations 
from other parties arising from the same set of facts, on grounds that “the needs 
of the Receiver outweigh the substantial injury being suffered by the Appellants”). 
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to equity receiverships and the courts supervising them.32 At first 
glance, however, the court’s perceived ability to preclude claims 
before they even come to light raises serious constitutional 
questions.33 The issue that cuts to the core of this facial imbalance 
is constitutional: namely, does the Complete Bar Order comprise 
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process and the right to 
sue?34 
C. Focus of Discussion Toward a Proposed Solution 
In addressing the constitutionality of the Complete Bar Order, 
this Note first addresses (in Part II) the history of the use of bar 
orders generally in receivership proceedings, as well as its 
contemporary usage in securities fraud litigation.35 Part III then 
examines the legal and scholarly justifications for the Complete 
Bar Order.36 Parts IV and V respond to these justifications in light 
of the fundamental right to sue under the Due Process clause.37 
Part VI then argues that these insufficiencies are further 
magnified in the context of class actions and class action opt-outs.38 
                                                                                                     
 32. See SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We review for 
abuse of discretion a district court’s decisions involving its supervision of an 
equitable receivership.”). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases 
[and Controversies], in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . .”); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 34. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right 
to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1633 (2004) (arguing 
the right to a remedy is a fundamental right, and that a “strict scrutiny calculus” 
must be used to justify any denial of it). 
 35. See infra notes 42–65 and accompanying text (examining the history of 
the bar order as an equitable remedy). 
 36. See infra notes 66–82 and accompanying text (examining the legal 
justifications used to validate the Complete Bar Order, particularly in the context 
of securities fraud litigation). 
 37. See infra notes 117–144 and accompanying text (discussing the 
constitutional inadequacies of due process present in the Complete Bar Order in 
a securities fraud setting). 
 38. See infra notes 145–156 and accompanying text (discussing the 
particularly problematic constitutional issues that arise when a court issues a 
Complete Bar Order where there are class action opt-outs). 
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By following this analytical roadmap, this Note concludes that 
the Complete Bar Order, in the context of securities fraud 
litigation, is an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to sue 
that violates the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.39 In the alternative, this Note proposes that the 
supervising court should assess receivership actions with a lesser 
degree of deference when such actions threaten an individual’s 
right to sue.40 Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, a 
Complete Bar Order should be presumed suspect, meriting strict 
scrutiny at the appellate level.41  
II. The History of the Bar Order in Class Action Settlements 
The Complete Bar Order has emerged as a contemporary 
result of the blending of equity receivership powers with a 
substantial uptick in securities fraud litigation.42 To understand 
this evolution, it is important to briefly address the legal 
ingredients of both equity receivership powers and securities fraud 
litigation in turn. 
                                                                                                     
 39. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”); see also infra notes 117–144 and accompanying text 
(concluding that the Complete Bar Order, in a securities fraud context, is facially 
unconstitutional).  
 40. In particular, this Note will propose that the receiver, as an officer and 
appointee of the court, be viewed as an agent of the state, thereby necessitating 
strict scrutiny of its actions when such are alleged to violate a fundamental right. 
See Thomas, supra note 34 (arguing that a “strict scrutiny calculus” must be used 
to justify any denial of the right to a remedy). 
 41. Contra SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We review 
for abuse of discretion a district court’s decisions involving its supervision of an 
equitable receivership.”); but see Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 
563 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[S]trict scrutiny applies to burdens on fundamental 
rights . . . .”). 
 42. See Kathy Bazoian Phelps, April 2016 Ponzi Scheme Roundup, 
LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (May 3, 2016, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/bankruptcy/b/bankruptcy-law-blog/ar
chive/2016/05/03/april-2016-ponzi-scheme-roundup.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 
2018) (providing a “Ponzi Scheme Update” of many presently litigated Ponzi-type 
cases, including many currently in receivership) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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A. Securities Fraud Litigation 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) 
provides for bar orders in certain circumstances to facilitate 
settlement between one of several codefendants and the plaintiff.43 
This provision (which this Note will hereinafter refer to as the “Bar 
Order Provision”) allows the court to “bar” pending or potential 
crossclaims between defendants and reflects the congressional 
intent to encourage settlement in securities fraud litigation, which 
often takes the form of complex, multi-party class actions.44  
Class action lawsuits are among the best ways to influence 
corporate behavior because fraud claims by individual investors do 
very little to materially affect a corporation’s balance sheet.45 The 
class action lawsuit, however, is an expensive endeavor, and the 
courts—as well as taxpayers—have a compelling interest in 
expediting such actions by means of facilitating settlement.46 
When one of several defendants wants to settle with the plaintiff, 
the looming threat of crossclaims from other defendants may 
discourage settlement, for fear that the settling defendant will 
have to “pay up” twice.47 The Bar Order Provision of the PSLRA 
                                                                                                     
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(7)(A) (2012) (“[T]he court shall enter a bar order 
constituting the final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the settling 
covered person arising out of the action. The order shall bar all future claims for 
contribution arising out of the action . . . .”); see also infra note 49 and 
accompanying text (highlighting the certain circumstances and types of damages 
under which the PSLRA operates). 
 44. See In re Ins. Broker Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. 136, 144 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(“[S]ettlement of litigation is especially favored by courts in the class action 
setting.”). 
 45. See Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a Prod, and a Big 
Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires 
Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
929, 932 (2005) (“[I]f equitable remedies are sought by plaintiffs and awarded by 
a court or consented to in a settlement agreement, a class action can be a bridle 
with which to lead a corporation in a certain direction.”); Deposit Guar. Nat’l 
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (“The aggregation of individual claims in the 
context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries 
unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”). 
 46. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768, 784 (3rd Cir. 1995) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class 
actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial resources can be 
conserved by avoiding formal litigation. . . . The parties may also gain 
significantly from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy and complex trial.”). 
 47. See Sheppard Mullin, Ninth Circuit Limits Scope of Settlement Bar 
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permits the court to permanently stay the impeding crossclaims so 
that the settling defendant and the plaintiff may settle their 
dispute without interference from non-settling defendants.48  
Courts have interpreted the Bar Order Provision of the 
PSLRA broadly, expanding the facial language of the statute 
(which limits bar orders to claims of “contribution”) to include 
crossclaims of subrogation and indemnification.49 Additionally, 
courts have used these same principles in non-SEC suits, including 
FDIC proceedings.50 While the application of the Bar Order 
Provision has expanded somewhat from its literal language, the 
courts have still refused to interpret the PSLRA to permit bar 
orders against non-parties to a case.51 Therefore, for the Complete 
Bar Order to work in class action securities fraud demands legal 
justification beyond the statutory language of the PSLRA.52 Some 
courts have found these justifications in the inherent powers of 
equity receiverships.53  
                                                                                                     
Orders in Securities Class Action Settlement, CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2008/11/ninth-circuit-limits-scope-of-
settlement-bar-orders-in-securities-class-action-settlement/ (last visited Apr. 5, 
2018) (“Settlement bar orders encourage partial settlements in cases with 
multiple defendants by protecting the settling defendants from contribution and 
other similar claims while ensuring that non-settling defendants do not incur 
more than their proportionate share of liability.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming the district court’s approval of a settlement agreement stipulating the 
extinguishment of all claims by the non-settling defendants against the settling 
defendants). 
 49. See id. (affirming a Complete Bar Order by non-settling defendants 
against settling defendants, including contract-based indemnification claims). 
 50. See FDIC v. Geldermann, Inc., 975 F.2d 695, 698–99 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(“Contribution bar orders are frequently upheld when they are sought by a 
settling defendant against a nonsettling defendant in the same case.”). 
 51. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] bar 
order issued in a partial settlement of a securities fraud class action case cannot 
bar independent claims.”). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See supra notes 25–46 and accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of 
deference to equity receivership decisions, and how an increased amount of 
securities fraud cases now involve entities put into receivership so that these 
rules of deference apply). 
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B. Equity Receivership Powers 
The bar order exists as a statutory remedy in securities fraud 
litigation under the PSLRA, but the bar order also exists in far 
broader terms as an equitable remedy (with no statutory 
limitations) in equity receivership proceedings.54 An equity 
receivership—acting like a trustee managing an estate in 
bankruptcy—benefits from high levels of deference to its 
discretionary powers as it performs its court-appointed task of 
settling an estate’s affairs.55 This deference takes the form of an 
“abuse of discretion” standard of review by the court that appoints 
and supervises it (the district court).56 When the supervising 
district court approves the receiver’s settlement, the appellate 
court considers the terms of that settlement—even when such 
terms include a bar order—with an equally high degree of 
deference.57 Such settlements frequently bar any future “related 
litigation” and even bar present litigation of independent claims in 
state courts, all in order to facilitate the receiver’s management of 
the estate.58 “Related litigation” includes litigation that may be 
filed by non-settling plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs with 
independent, damage-based claims.59 This permanent blanket stay 
                                                                                                     
 54. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (“The court may issue any order, process, 
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title.”); In re UAL Corp., 386 B.R. 701, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[In a receivership 
proceeding], a bankruptcy court may stay a particular nonbankruptcy 
action . . . .” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (2012); Jaytee-Penndel Co. v. Bloor, 547 
F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
 55. See SEC v. Kaleta, 530 F. App’x 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘[T]he district court 
has broad powers and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an 
equity receivership.’” (quoting SEC v. Sec. Fin. Serv., Inc., 674 F.2d 368, 372–73 
(5th Cir. 1982))). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Sterling v. Stewart, 158 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(“‘Determining the fairness of the settlement is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court and we will not overturn the court’s decision absent a clear showing of 
abuse of that discretion.’” (quoting Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d, 982, 986 
(11th Cir. 1984))). 
 58. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
a district court order enjoining a law firm from filing “any new Enron-related 
actions” without first obtaining permission from the district court); see also SEC 
v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (barring state court proceedings 
in a securities fraud case). 
 59. See Wencke, 622 F.2d at 1369 (stating that the court has “inherent 
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of all claims, both pending and potential, originating from “both 
sides of the ‘v’”—the Complete Bar Order—is common practice in 
bankruptcy proceedings by virtue of the discretionary powers of 
the receiver and the deferential standard of review granted it.60 
Since the economic collapse of 2008, a wave of Ponzi schemes61 
has produced a substantial uptick of equity receiverships and 
class-action securities lawsuits.62 Where the PSLRA alone would 
limit bar orders in these cases to claims for indemnification, 
subrogation, and contribution by non-settling defendants, the 
existence of an equity receiver invokes the deference that courts 
generally afford a trustee in managing an estate.63 In other words, 
courts have affirmed the powers of a receivership in a securities 
fraud, class action setting to issue a Complete Bar Order when 
there otherwise could not have been one.64 While courts have 
                                                                                                     
equitable authority” to issue “ancillary relief” measures, including injunctions to 
stay proceedings by non-parties, and affirming such an injunction). 
 60. See generally Newby, 302 F.3d at 300; Sterling, 158 F.3d at 1202; In re 
Greektown Holdings, LLC, 2012 WL 4484933 (E.D. Mich. 2012), affirmed in part 
and vacated in part, 728 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2013); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 
F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re UAL Corp., 398 B.R. 243 (N.D. Ill. 2008); see also 
Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Handling Claims in Ponzi Scheme Bankruptcy and 
Receivership Cases, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 543 (2012) 
(dealing with the turnover of property to a trustee in bankruptcy proceedings); 
infra notes 83–85 (discussing the acceptance of Complete Bar Orders in 
bankruptcy). 
 61. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and 
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 158 (1998) (defining “Ponzi 
scheme” as “a fraudulent investment program in which the returns paid to 
investors are comprised of nothing more than the principal investments made by 
other investors”). 
 62. The list of Ponzi-scheme type cases in recent years is staggering. A 
non-exhaustive list of such frauds that were managed by an equity receiver 
includes Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities ($18 billion), Stanford 
Financial Group ($8 billion), Aequitas Capital Management ($350 million), J 
Peak Resort ($200 million), Creative Capital ($70 million), Atlantic Bullion & 
Coin ($60 million), Vesta Strategies ($25 million), and Credit Nation ($5 million). 
See Phelps, supra note 42 (providing brief updates on litigations pending in 
forty-nine Ponzi schemes worldwide). 
 63. See 28 U.S.C. § 959 (2012); (dealing with receivers and trustees, both as 
officers of the court, jointly); Imperial Assur. Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 749 
(8th Cir. 1931) (“[T]he receiver and the trustee are officers of the court for the 
purposes of handling such property in accordance with the directions of the court 
within the act; and that their relation to the property is purely and solely in such 
official capacities.”). 
 64. See generally Gordon v. Dadante, 336 F. App’x 540 (6th Cir. 2009) 
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specifically addressed the constitutionality of the PSLRA bar 
order, the constitutional question of whether a court may 
permissibly issue a Complete Bar Order under this “equity 
receivership” justification remains unanswered.65 
III. The Legal Landscape and Justifications for the Complete 
Bar Order 
A. Deference to an Equity Receiver 
Generally, case law and scholarship tend to endorse or at least 
recognize a highly deferential standard of review to equity 
receivership actions, which themselves are subject to broad 
discretionary powers.66 
The limitations on an equity receiver’s power are, at best, 
ambiguous and ill-defined.67 Little case law addresses the outer 
limits to this discretionary power; any limitations are statutory in 
form and broad in nature.68 Courts have read statutory provisions 
                                                                                                     
(affirming a bar order in a securities fraud case involving an equity receiver); 
Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n (N.D. Tex. 
Aug. 30, 2016) (same); SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(stating that the court has “inherent equitable authority” to issue “ancillary relief” 
measures, including injunctions to stay proceedings by non-parties, and affirming 
such an injunction). 
 65. There is no case law affirmatively setting forward what a receiver is or 
is not allowed to do. Instead, there are grants of broad discretion at a statutory 
level and permissive stances on various issues as they are brought before the 
courts. Compare Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Ruttenberg, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220 (N.D. 
Ala. 2004) (holding that the bar could constitutionally extinguish claims which 
could be reasonably asserted by co-defendants), with Jared A. Wilkerson, In 
Whose Shoes?: Third-Party Standing and “Binding” Arbitration Clauses in 
Securities Fraud Receiverships, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 45, 51 (2011) (“The three 
main statutes that govern equity receiverships are simple and broad, leaving 
enormous discretion to common law precedent in equity.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
66; 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 959 (2006))). 
 66. See SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the 
discretion of the receiver and the deference afforded it by the courts). 
 67. See David A. Gradwall & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi 
Schemes, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 204–08 (2010) (arguing that the 
limitations on equity receiverships include the ability to sue only based on 
damages to the entity in receivership, the frequent lack of third parties’ 
wherewithal to compensate, the use of in pari delicto defenses, the need for 
justiciable standing, and the inability to represent investors directly).  
 68. See Wilkerson, supra note 65, at 51 (“The three main statutes that 
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to grant receivers “enormous” room for discretion, subject only to 
the court’s directions at the time of its appointment.69 In this way, 
the court directions to appointment of an equity receiver are 
analogous to the trust instrument from which a given trustee’s 
powers originate.70 The relationship between the court and the 
receiver also parallels the relationship between the legislature and 
a government agency, where the legislature in drafting the 
statutes creating the agency provides an “intelligible principle” for 
that agency to follow.71 The courts review virtually every action by 
the agency in accordance with that “intelligible principle” only for 
abuse of discretion.72 Like a trustee working in accordance with its 
organic instrument, or a government agency working in 
accordance with its organic act, the equity receiver, working in 
accordance with court instructions, operates with wide 
discretion.73 
Courts continue to afford this discretion—and its 
accompanying “abuse of discretion” standard of review—to 
receivership actions despite the dubious success rates of receivers 
in securities fraud cases.74 In a securities fraud case, the receiver 
                                                                                                     
govern equity receiverships are simple and broad, leaving enormous discretion to 
common law precedent in equity.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 66; 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2006); 
28 U.S.C. § 959 (2006))). 
 69. Id. at 51; see also Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(granting discretionary powers to the district court to issue permanent 
injunctions); Sterling v. Stewart, 158 F.3d 1199, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); 
Imperial Assur. Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1931) (defining the 
receiver in a bankruptcy proceeding as an “officer[] of the court for the purposes 
of handling the property in accordance with the directions of the court . . .”). 
 70. See Eisenrich v. Minneapolis Retail Meat Cutters and Food Handlers 
Pension Fund, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1081 (D. Minn. 2003) (“When, as here, a 
trust instrument gives a trustee the discretion to interpret its terms, the court 
reviews those interpretations under the deferential abuse of discretion 
standard.”).  
 71. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as 
Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to 
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.’” 
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See supra notes 55, 63 (listing cases and statutes comparing the receiver 
to a trustee and enabling it with discretionary powers). 
 74. One example of the great discrepancy that can be found depending on 
the competency of the receiver in a given case arises when comparing the two 
largest Ponzi-schemes in world history. The receiver in the Madoff scheme has 
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is essentially responsible for determining rates, amounts, and 
frequency of disbursements to investors (creditors).75 Poor 
decisions by the receiver can lead to poor results for the individual 
claimants.76 Similar to class action attorneys, receivers also take 
substantial fees from any recovery; this in turn reduces the 
recovery of defrauded investors.77 Under the abuse of discretion 
standard of review, the actual effectiveness of receivership 
action—and its trickle-down effects to investors—is not subject to 
review by the court.78 In consequence, the receiver actions are 
dictated more by the court instructions governing it than they are 
by actual needs of the defrauded investors.79 
The standard of review for receivership actions—particularly 
those actions affirmed by the supervising court—does not intensify 
at the appellate level; appellate courts review a supervising court’s 
deference to a receiver’s decision for abuse of discretion only.80 The 
                                                                                                     
succeeded in distributing approximately $11.1 billion (61% of the total principal 
invested) to defrauded investors. The receiver in Stanford, however, has only 
returned $55 million (>1% of the total principal invested). Compare Kryger, supra 
note 16 (detailing the fee patterns and recovery techniques of the Stanford equity 
receivership), with Charles Lane, Some Madoff Investors to Get All Their Money 
Back, NPR, (Oct. 21, 2015 5:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/21/450464745/ 
some-madoff-investors-to-get-all-their -money-back (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) 
(detailing the returns expected of Madoff investors) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 75. Compare Kryger, supra note 16 (highlighting the minimal returns to 
Stanford investors), with Lane, supra note 74 (detailing the substantial expected 
returns to Madoff investors). 
 76. See Kryger, supra note 16.  
 77. See Kryger, supra note 16 (stating that $55 million return to investors 
was out of a total recovery of $235 million, the remainder going toward expenses 
and fees to the receiver of up to $400 an hour); supra note 74 (detailing the effect 
of receivership actions on defrauded investors by contrasting the effectiveness of 
the Madoff recovery plan with that of the Stanford recovery plan). 
 78. See Sterling v. Stewart, 158 F.3d 1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(“Determining the fairness of the settlement [in an equity receivership] is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not overturn the court’s decision 
absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.”). 
 79. See Canney v. City of Chelsea, 925 F. Supp. 58, 65 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(“[C]ourts have the power to appoint a receiver, who is then subject to the court’s 
control.”). 
 80. See Gordon v. Dadante, 336 F. App’x 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2009) (“This Court 
reviews a district court’s decision to approve a settlement agreement in the 
context of an equity receivership for abuse of discretion.” (citing Liberte Capital 
Grp., LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2006))). 
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Ninth Circuit has made this very clear in a fair summation of the 
appellate court’s treatment of equity receivership actions: 
We reemphasize these basic principles. A district judge 
supervising an equity receivership faces a myriad of 
complicated problems in dealing with the various parties and 
issues involved in administering the receivership. Reasonable 
administrative procedures, crafted to deal with the complex 
circumstances of each case, will be upheld. A district judge 
simply cannot effectively and successfully supervise a 
receivership and protect the interests of its beneficiaries absent 
broad discretionary power. We would be remiss were we to 
interfere with a district court’s supervision of an equity 
receivership absent a clear abuse of discretion.81 
Together, the two legal realities of substantial discretionary 
powers of the receiver and highly deferential standards of review 
by the courts work to insulate a Complete Bar Order from 
meaningful review.82 However, what is right in bankruptcy is not 
necessarily right in an Article III class action setting, particularly 
in the complex world of securities fraud litigation. 
B. The Important Distinction Between Bankruptcy and Class 
Action Securities Litigation 
The Complete Bar Order is widely accepted in the narrow 
contexts of bankruptcy because it acts to protect the debtor’s 
estate.83 The only limitation on the bankruptcy court’s ability to 
approve a settlement agreement that contains a Complete Bar 
Order relates to the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
over the barred claims.84 That jurisdiction exists so long as there 
is a nexus between the barred claims and the actual bankruptcy 
case.85 Because a Complete Bar Order requires such a nexus in the 
                                                                                                     
 81. SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 82. See SEC v. Kaleta, 530 F. App’x 360, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming a 
Complete Bar Order on grounds of broad powers and wide discretion granted a 
district court supervising an equity receivership). 
 83. See In re Land Res., LLC, 505 B.R. 571, 578 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (stating 
that barred claims impact the handling and administering of the bankruptcy 
estate). 
 84. See id. (“First the bankruptcy court must determine whether it has 
subject matter over the barred claims.”). 
 85. See Matter of Mumford, Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 453 (11th Cir. 1996) (“In order 
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securities fraud realm—the Complete Bar Order does not prevent 
a disgruntled employee from suing BDO on an unrelated matter, 
for example86—courts have justified its use.87 
Bankruptcy, however, operates differently than class action 
litigation.88 Bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts, and are 
thereby not subject to the constitutional limitation to actions in 
cases and controversies.89 Bankruptcy is a vehicle that has been 
socially-accepted as a means of debt forgiveness, and the 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts is limited to actions against the 
debtor only.90 Securities fraud class actions, however, can and do 
                                                                                                     
for the bankruptcy court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, 
however, some nexus between the civil proceeding and the [bankruptcy] case 
must exist.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Philip Gonzales, Asian American Woman Accuses Accounting 
Firm of Racial Discrimination, SE TEX. RECORD (Sept. 22 2016, 12:59 PM), 
setexasrecord.com/stories/511012151-asian-american-woman-accuses-
accounting-firm-of-racial-discrimination (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (reporting on 
employment discrimination lawsuit against BDO) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 87. See Notice of Settlement and Bar Order at 2, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, 
Ltd., No. 3:09-CV-0298-N, Official Stanford Inv’rs Comm. v. BDO USA, LLP, No. 
3:12-CV-01447-N, Wilkinson v. BDO USA, LLP, No. 3:11-CV-01115-N (N.D. Tex. 
May 23, 2015) (stating that a Complete Bar Order applies to all claims “arising 
from or relating to [the] Settled Claim against [BDO]”). 
 88. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS: BANKR. JUDGES DIV., BANKRUPTCY 
BASICS 5–6 (3rd ed. 2011) (discussing the Congressional origin of bankruptcy, how 
it is governed by its own code and rules of procedure, and its courts’ primary 
function as administrative bodies). 
 89. Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[The Congress shall have power to] 
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power of the United 
States shall extend to all Cases, in law and 
equity, . . . and . . . Controversies . . . .”). 
 90. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS: BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 86, 
at 6 (“A fundamental goal of the federal bankruptcy laws enacted by Congress is 
to give debtors a financial ‘fresh start’ from burdensome debts.”); Local Loan Co. 
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”); see also 
Matter of Munford, Inc., 97 F.3d 449, 453 (11th Cir. 1996) (requiring a nexus 
between the claim and the actual financial integrity of the debtor’s estate). 
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function against third parties, including aiders and abettors.91 The 
bankruptcy court cannot bar such actions.92 
Because class action securities litigation is a completely 
different arena than that of bankruptcy, the Complete Bar Order 
must be viewed with greater scrutiny, particularly in actions 
against third party aiders and abettors. As currently applied, the 
legal justifications for the Complete Bar Order are insufficient 
because they do not consider the substantial constitutional rights 
at risk.93 
IV. The Constitutional Right to Sue (or, the Constitutional Right 
to a Remedy) 
A. Generally 
The Complete Bar Order effectively blocks potential plaintiffs 
from open access to the courts by denying them the right to sue the 
settling party who has allegedly harmed them.94 The issue arises, 
however, in that there is a constitutional right to sue—also known 
as the “right to open access to the courts” or the “right to a 
remedy”—and the bar order, in any context, constitutes a 
deprivation of this right.95 All bar orders, and particularly the 
                                                                                                     
 91. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 29, Official Stanford 
Inv’rs Comm. v. BDO USA, LLP, No. 3:12-CV-01447-N, 2014 WL 10748581 (N.D. 
Tex. May 13, 2014) (recognizing the BDO case as an example of creditors filing 
suit against a third-party aider and abettor). 
 92. See Munford, 97 F.3d at 453 (stating that the bankruptcy court can only 
bar claims against the debtor, even if such claims are tenuous, on grounds that 
the claims could have bearing on the management, reorganization, or liquidation 
of the estate). 
 93. See infra notes 117–144 and accompanying text (discussing the 
constitutional inadequacies of the Complete Bar Order in securities fraud cases). 
 94. See Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2016) (“This Court hereby permanently bars, restrains, and 
enjoins the Receiver, the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested Parties, and all 
other Persons or entities anywhere in the world, . . . from . . . instituting, 
reinstituting, intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, 
filing . . . or otherwise prosecuting [the settling party].” (emphasis added)). 
 95. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (speaking of “the 
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts”); Thomas R. Phillips, The 
Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1309–12 (2003) 
(discussing the constitutional right to a remedy); Thomas, supra note 34, at 1633 
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Complete Bar Order, must, therefore, follow due process to avoid 
unconstitutionality.96 
Currently, forty of the fifty states in the United States have 
codified the right to sue, usually in the Bill of Rights of their own 
constitutions.97 The Supreme Court also found the right to be seek 
remedy before a court of law to be an essential element of “natural 
justice” that is fundamental to the American jurisprudential 
system. 98 Likewise, legal scholarship views the right to sue as an 
integral aspect of liberty protected by the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution.99  
Regardless of the context wherein it arises, any bar order 
inherently constitutes a deprivation of the right to sue by 
preventing a given plaintiff, or plaintiffs, from pursuing 
compensation for their injuries under both law and equity.100 The 
Constitution requires, then, that the bar order follow proper due 
process.101  
The degree of deference to state action that inhibits, impairs, 
or intrudes on an individual liberty interest varies depending on 
                                                                                                     
(arguing the right to a remedy is a fundamental right). 
 96. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
 97. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (establishing a right of remedy or access 
to the courts); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10 (same); see Phillips, supra note 95, at 1309 
(“The remedy clause, . . . appears in the constitutions of forty states.”). 
 98. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (speaking to the right 
to be heard as a principle that “lies at the foundation of all well-ordered systems 
of jurisprudence . . . founded in the first principles of natural justice”). 
 99. See Phillips, supra note 95, at 1319–20 (introducing the historical 
significance of the right to a remedy); John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in 
State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 237, 244 (1991) (discussing the interpretations of state constitutional 
treatment of the right to a remedy). 
 100. See Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n 
(N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2016) (“This Court hereby permanently bars, restrains, 
and enjoins the Receiver, the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested Parties, 
and all other Persons or entities anywhere in the world, . . . from . . . instituting, 
reinstituting, intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, 
filing . . . or otherwise prosecuting [the settling party].” (emphasis added)). 
 101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing Due Process 
clauses). 
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the nature of that liberty interest;102 some liberty interests, 
according to perhaps the most seminal footnote in American 
jurisprudence, are more important than others.103 The question, 
then, arises as to the nature of the right to sue: is the right of such 
a fundamental nature so as to merit strict scrutiny by the courts 
reviewing any state action alleged to have intruded upon it? 
Consequently, is the right to sue so fundamental that the Complete 
Bar Order, which denies that right to so many injured parties, 
must pass strict scrutiny review instead of currently-applied abuse 
of discretion review? 
B. The Fundamental Nature of the Right to a Remedy 
The former Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, Thomas 
R. Phillips, has extensively analyzed the right to sue, which he, in 
his writing designates as the right to a remedy.104 His analysis 
proves helpful in determining the standard of review for upholding 
or denying a Complete Bar Order.105 
First, the right to a remedy is fundamental.106 In assessing 
whether a right is fundamental, the court often works to determine 
whether the right has “long been recognized as one of the vital 
                                                                                                     
 102. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 565 (5th ed. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] articulated the idea that 
different constitutional claims would be subjected to varying levels of review.”). 
 103. See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution . . . .”); see also J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. 
U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (“When constitutional scholars refer to the ‘problem of 
the footnote,’ they are referring to a specific footnote, the Footnote, footnote four 
of United States v. Carolene Products . . . .”); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985) (“Carolene proposed to make 
the ideals of the victorious activist Democracy serve as a primary foundation for 
constitutional rights in the United States.”). 
 104. See Phillips, supra note 95, at 1309 (analyzing the right to a remedy). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 1309–23 (discussing the historical origins and significance of 
the right to a remedy); ERWIN W. CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 (4th 
ed.) (“The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so important that they 
are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and that generally the government cannot 
infringe them unless strict scrutiny is met; that is, the government’s action must 
be necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.”). 
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personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”107 Looking to case law and history, Justice Phillips described 
the right to a remedy as “the most important” liberty “[o]f all the 
rights guaranteed by state constitutions but absent from the 
federal Bill of Rights.”108 
Second, the right to a remedy is deeply rooted in notions of 
justice.109 This analysis is primarily historical in function.110 
Justice Phillips observes the evolution of the right to a remedy 
from its inception to its most modern applications.111 The right to 
a remedy finds its origins in the Magna Carta.112 Sir Edward Coke 
wrote of a free and speedy right to a remedy for injuries.113 Sir 
William Blackstone later described the right to a remedy as the 
means whereby all other rights are protected.114 Subsequently, 
when the several states of the newfound American nation were 
drafting their respective constitutions, the framers made sure to 
include this right in their understanding of protected rights at the 
state level.115 The Supreme Court has continued to afford this right 
                                                                                                     
 107. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 108. Phillips, supra note 95, at 1309. 
 109. See Brill v. Hedges, 783 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“To 
determine whether a right not enumerated in the Constitution is ‘fundamental,’ 
and therefore deserving of special scrutiny by the judiciary, the Court must ask 
whether the right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.’” (citing 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))). 
 110. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“The balance 
of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions 
from which it broke.” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 111. See Phillips, supra note 95, at 1309–23 (discussing the historical origins 
and significance of the right to a remedy). 
 112. See MAGNA CARTA, chs. 39–40 (1215) (“N[o] free man shall be seized or 
imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions, . . . except by the legal 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one 
will we deny, or delay right or justice.”). 
 113. See Phillips, supra note 95, at 1320–21 (“[E]very subject. . . for injury 
done to him . . . by any other subject, . . . may take his remedy by the course of 
the law, and have justice . . . for the injury . . . freely . . . and speedily. . . .” (quoting 
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 
(1641, photo. reprint 1986))). 
 114. See id. at 1321–22 (explaining Blackstone’s understanding of the right to 
a remedy as the means whereby “absolute rights to life, liberty and property” were 
protected (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124)). 
 115. See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (establishing a right of remedy or access to the 
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the sort of treatment generally granted a fundamental right, the 
protection of which merits strict scrutiny in judicial review.116  
The issue that arises, then, is this: if the right to sue is so 
fundamental to merit strict scrutiny by the courts, why is it only 
afforded abuse of discretion review when denied by a Complete Bar 
Order in a receivership setting? 
V. The Complete Bar Order Does Not Satisfy Due Process 
Despite historical justifications and existing PSLRA 
jurisprudence,117 the Complete Bar Order, in today’s legal 
landscape, satisfies neither substantive nor procedural due process 
when used in securities fraud cases.118 
The PSLRA has passed constitutional muster, because courts 
consider the rights to indemnification or contribution precluded by 
its Bar Order Provision to be seizeable “property” rights.119 The 
Bar Order Provision of the PSLRA, however, does not justify the 
Complete Bar Order because the right to an independent claim (i.e. 
the right to sue) is not a property right; it is a protected liberty 
                                                                                                     
courts); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10 (same); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, par. 12 (same); 
ME. CONST. art. I, § 19 (same); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 19 (same); MASS. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 11 (same); PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (same); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9 (same); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 4 (same); VA. CONST. art. III, 
§ 17 (same); see also Phillips, supra note 95, at 1323 (“As Gordon Wood notes, 
[colonists] recognized that laws protecting their basic freedoms must be of ‘a 
nature more sacred than those which established a turnpike road.” (quoting 
Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American 
Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 920 (1993))). 
 116. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (speaking of “the 
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts”); Windsor v. McVeigh, 
93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (speaking of the right to a remedy as a foundational 
element of American jurisprudence); Thomas, supra note 34, at 1643 (“State 
action that abridges a fundamental right, including the right to a remedy, is 
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis that balances the interests of the state 
against the fundamental interest.”). 
 117. See supra notes 66–93 and accompanying text (describing current 
justifications for the Complete Bar Order in securities fraud cases). 
 118. See infra notes 125–144 (explaining why the Complete Bar Order 
violates both procedural and substantive due process). 
 119. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Ruttenberg, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220 (N.D. Ala. 
2004) (holding that the bar could permissibly extinguish claims which could be 
reasonably asserted by co-defendants, and this did not violate the co-defendants 
substantive due process rights). 
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interest under the Due Process clause.120 
Constitutionally-protected liberty interests merit more protection 
under the Due Process clause than other rights, such as a contract 
or property right to indemnification.121 
A. Procedural Due Process Considerations 
At the heart of the Due Process clause is the right to be heard 
prior to deprivation by the state of one’s life, liberty, or property.122 
Conversely, at the heart of the right to sue lies the right to be heard 
after harm has already occurred.123 The right to be heard is a 
fundamental concept that informs both the right to sue and the 
right to due process; as such, it is the driving focus of all procedural 
due process analyses.124 Was a procedure in place to give the 
aggrieved party the right to be heard? 
The Complete Bar Order differs from PSLRA bar orders 
because it bars action from non-parties, whereas the PSLRA only 
approves bar orders against non-settling defendants for 
contribution or indemnification.125 This distinguishing feature tips 
the Complete Bar Order over the edge, ignoring minimum levels of 
procedural due process; essentially, it operates as a court order 
                                                                                                     
 120. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[In a 
PSLRA case], a bar order issued in a partial settlement of a securities fraud class 
action case cannot bar independent claims.”). 
 121. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 565 (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] 
articulated the idea that different constitutional claims would be subjected to 
varying levels of review.”). 
 122. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (“A fundamental 
requirement of due process is ‘the opportunity to be heard.’” (quoting Grannis v. 
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))). 
 123. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (speaking of the right 
to be heard as a central facet of justice). 
 124. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (stating that the Due Process clause, at 
its most basic, guarantees that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property “by 
adjudication” be preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing). 
 125. Compare Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 
3:09-cv-0298-n (N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2016) (barring “the Receiver, the 
Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested Parties, and all other Persons or entities 
anywhere in the world” from pursuing future litigation against settling defendant 
(emphasis added)), with In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d 667, 676 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[In a PSLRA case], a bar order issued in a partial settlement of a securities 
fraud class action case cannot bar independent claims.”). 
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against parties who have never been given the right to be heard 
before any court.126 
To follow proper procedure under the Due Process clause, the 
aggrieved party must receive notice.127 In PSLRA litigation, the 
Bar Order Provision itself would probably constitute proper notice 
to any co-defendant filing a crossclaim in a securities fraud action; 
where parties reach a settlement contingent on obtaining a 
Complete Bar Order, however, there is no notice to the parties 
which the court is barring—settlements in receivership actions, 
generally, occur behind closed doors before they are publicly put 
before the court for approval.128  
This lack of notice is already enough to declare the Complete 
Bar Order as an unconstitutional intrusion upon the right to a 
remedy, but the analysis need not stop there.129 A greater problem 
persists in that there is no right to be heard at all. While the 
parties may be able to file intervenor motions, objections to the 
settlement, or amicus curiae briefs,130 these cannot suffice as 
opportunities to be heard before the denial of an actual claim.131  
                                                                                                     
 126. Id. 
 127. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (stating that the Due Process clause, at 
its most basic, guarantees that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property “by 
adjudication” be preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing). 
 128. See generally Symposium, Behind Closed Doors: Confidential 
Settlements and Sealed Court Records, 76 JUDICATURE 303 (1993) (discussing the 
generally private and confidential nature of settlement agreements, including the 
general practice to keep settlement terms and discovery confidential after 
agreement is reached). 
 129. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (stating that Due Process requires both 
opportunity for hearing and notice). 
 130. See FED. R. APP. P. 26 (discussing Brief of an Amicus Curiae); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 24 (Intervernor Motions). 
 131. In fact, such motions and briefs are seen more often as procedural 
encumbrances, and are only admitted on permission of the court. As a practical 
matter, the court would probably not grant such permission: because the 
Complete Bar Order arises in the context of settlement, it is unlikely that either 
of the two parties to the settlement will acquiesce to an intervenor or amicus 
curiae who is attempting to halt it. The Complete Bar Order is a settlement 
device, which generally results in a stipulated order.  From there, the court’s 
deference to the receiver takes hold, and any objections are prejudicially 
handicapped. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1) (“On timely motion, the court may 
permit anyone to intervene who . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Strasser v. 
Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970) (“As an attorney of our acquaintance 
once told the court, when asked for his response to the argument of the amicus, 
‘That fellow isn't any more a friend of the court than I am.’”); In re MetLife 
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B. Substantive Due Process Considerations 
Even when proper procedure has been followed, an intrusion 
on life, liberty, or property can be so substantively contradictory to 
notions of justice that it offends the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution.132 For an intrusion to constitute a violation of this 
substantive due process, however, it must first be state action.133  
The Complete Bar Order is state action.134 The supervising 
court is a vehicle of the state, a basic unit in the third branch of 
the United States government.135 Indeed, actions of the judiciary 
are no different than legislative or executive actions in that they 
are able (though certainly not permitted) to violate the 
constitutionally-protected rights of the people, which is best 
illustrated through the doctrine forbidding prior restraints.136 A 
prior restraint includes any court order that prevents speech prior 
to the speech having ever occurred; it is a court-ordered denial of a 
                                                                                                     
Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“There is ‘a 
presumption of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy as to the settlement 
where a class settlement is reached in arm's-length negotiations between 
experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery.’” (quoting McReynolds 
v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 803 (2d Cir. 2009))); Susan Kenny, Interveners 
and Amici Curiae in the High Court, AUSTLII.EDU (1997), 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedJSchol/ 1997/1.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2018) (showing the courts’ increasing willingness to allow special interest 
interveners or those with fundamental legal interests to intervene) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Michael J. Harris, Amicus 
Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American Jurisprudence, 5 
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC’Y 1 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of 
amici curiae generally) 
 132. See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 102, at 525–65 (discussing the 
incorporation doctrine, and its analysis of a given liberty’s “fundamental” nature, 
and the doctrines of State Action and Entanglement). 
 133. See id. at 532–65 (generally discussing the State Action doctrine in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 134. See infra notes 135–144 and accompanying text (discussing the Complete 
Bar Order as a state action under substantive due process analysis). 
 135. See U.S. CONST. art. III (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 
(1968) (“The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our federal 
system.”). 
 136. See In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Prior restraints—
defined as ‘predetermined judicial prohibition[s] restraining specific 
expression’ . . . receive a ‘presumption against their constitutionality.’” (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2000))).  
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fundamental right before an individual is able to exercise that 
right.137 Is not the Complete Bar Order a prior restraint on the 
right to sue?138 
Because an equity receiver is an officer of the court operating 
under the direction and supervision of the court, then any equity 
receiver’s actions, when affirmed by the supervising court, should 
be viewed as state actions.139 To invoke an analogy used earlier in 
this Note, the delegation of equity powers to the receiver by the 
supervising court is not unlike the delegation of legislative powers 
granted executive agencies by Congress.140  
Indeed, the analogy of the executive agency is perhaps more 
appropriate than the more popular analogy of the trustee when it 
comes to examining receivership actions in a securities fraud 
setting. While a trustee’s actions are reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion regardless of the alleged injury, the actions of a 
government agency are subject to strict scrutiny when they are 
alleged to have denied a fundamental right in violation of 
substantive due process.141 
Where a Complete Bar Order has been issued, the state, 
through court order, has effectively denied the fundamental right 
to sue to all non-settling parties, whether they are parties to the 
present suit or not.142 It follows that “heightened, substantive due 
                                                                                                     
 137. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“The term prior 
restraint is used ‘to describe . . . judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications 
are to occur.’” (quoting M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, 4–14 
(1984))).  
 138. See Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, 833 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(“A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny access to 
a forum for expression before the expression occurs.”). 
 139. See Imperial Assur. Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.2d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1931) 
(defining the receiver in a bankruptcy proceeding as an “officer[] of the court for 
the purposes of handling the property in accordance with the directions of the 
court”). 
 140. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (analogizing the equity 
receiver to an executive agency to which legislative power is delegated). 
 141. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (stating that INS regulations 
leading to arrest had to pass a “heightened, substantive due process scrutiny,” 
which necessitated a “sufficiently compelling governmental interest”).  
 142. See Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n 
(N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2016) (“This Court hereby permanently bars, restrains, 
and enjoins the Receiver, the Plaintiffs, the Claimants, the Interested Parties, 
and all other Persons or entities anywhere in the world, . . . from . . . instituting, 
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process scrutiny” should guide review of any Complete Bar Order 
when it occurs in a securities fraud setting.143 The governmental 
interest in expediting class action settlements does not outweigh 
the importance of access to the courts.144 
VI. The Complete Bar Order as a Constructive Intrusion and 
Regulation of Constitutional Rights 
The aforementioned constitutional issues surrounding the 
Complete Bar Order multiply in the context of the class action 
opt-out. When an individual uses statutorily-prescribed 
mechanisms to best utilize his or her right to sue by opting out of 
a class action, the Complete Bar Order acts not only as a denial of 
rights, but as a constructive punishment.145  
Class actions are already constitutionally problematic, 
thereby necessitating an opt-out mechanism.146 In a class action, 
usually, the member plaintiff does not choose to litigate.147 The 
                                                                                                     
reinstituting, intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, 
filing . . . or otherwise prosecuting [the settling party].” (emphasis added)); see 
also supra notes 62–73 (demonstrating that the right to a remedy is a 
fundamental right deeply rooted in American notions of justice). 
 143. Reno, 507 U.S. at 316. 
 144. Contra SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 424 F. App’x 338, 341 (5th Cir. 
2011) (per curiam) (affirming indefinite stay on litigations pending or potential 
from other parties with individual claims arising from the same set of facts on 
grounds that “the needs of the Receiver outweigh the substantial injury being 
suffered by the Appellants”). 
 145. See infra notes 146–156 and accompanying text (detailing how the 
Complete Bar Order works, effectively, as a punishment for those who 
conscientiously opt-out of a class action). 
 146. See Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil 
Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice—Constitutional Democracy and the 
Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit, 104 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 319, 319 (2010) 
(“[T]he class action procedure as applied today is profoundly troubling from a 
constitutional perspective.” (reviewing MARTIN REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 
(2009)); Jay Tidmarsh & David Betson, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights and 
“Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 543 (“The right to opt-out has 
a constitutional basis of uncertain breadth, but, at a minimum, seems to require 
an opt-out right for some class members in many class actions that seek monetary 
relief.”). 
 147. See Smith, supra note 146, at 319–20 (restating Redish’s assertion that 
class actions “infringe the due process right to individual autonomy by sweeping 
large numbers of individuals into litigation . . . without explicit consent”). 
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member plaintiff does not participate in the litigation process to 
anywhere near the same extent he or she would in an individual 
lawsuit.148 The individual member does not get to pick his or her 
attorney.149 Perhaps most problematic of all, the actual remedy in 
a class-action lawsuit rarely matches the injury suffered.150 
Despite these constitutionally problematic shortcomings, class 
actions live on because of the significant public policy reasons 
justifying them.151 
For class actions to survive constitutional scrutiny—and in 
order for class actions to continue as effective and efficient 
influencers of corporate behavior—the opt-out mechanism exists to 
protect the constitutional rights of potential class members, 
particularly their right to sue.152 Because of the opt-out 
mechanism, an individual can decide to pursue litigation with an 
attorney of his or her own choosing.153 The plaintiff can negotiate 
a fee arrangement, and actively participate in its own litigation.154 
And, in accordance with the ultimate aim of the constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 148. See id.  
 149. See id.  
 150. See Tidmarsh & Betson, supra note 108, at 544–46 (introducing concepts 
of optimal class sizes).  
 151. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (highlighting the utility of 
class actions as one of the few effective ways to influence corporate behavior, 
provide litigation efficiency, and avoid over-crowded dockets). 
 152. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding 
“that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with 
opportunity to remove himself from the class” by means of the opt-out 
mechanism); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B) (discussing the certification 
procedure for class actions and the availability of the option to affirmatively 
request exclusion from the class, which the court would subsequently permit). 
 153. This directly resolves the Constitutional issues described supra notes 
146–150. It is also interesting to note that Redish believes the opt-out mechanism 
is, itself, constitutionally insufficient; that is, however, the mechanism currently 
on the books in order to validate the class action procedure generally. See Smith, 
supra note 146, at 320 (“Redish argues that allowing due process rights to be 
waived simply by inaction, as under the current version of the rule, does not 
sufficiently protect such constitutional rights.”). Contra Phillips Petroleum, 472 
U.S. at 812 (striking down petitioner’s contention that “opt-in” mechanisms are 
necessary to satisfy due process). 
 154. See Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 811–12 (discussing the need for an 
opt-out mechanism). 
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right to a remedy—or the right to sue—the plaintiff is far more 
able to obtain a recovery that actually matches the injury.155 
The Complete Bar Order acts as a punishment against certain 
plaintiffs for exercising their constitutional rights in civil litigation 
as class opt-outs.156 The Complete Bar Order, therefore, 
constitutes a constructive intrusion or constructive regulation of 
these rights. 
VII. The Solution 
The Complete Bar Order, when used in a securities fraud 
setting, is unconstitutional state action that deprives all claimants 
(plaintiffs and codefendants, actual and potential) of a 
fundamental right absent substantive and procedural due 
process.157 It is not a mere limitation of that right; it is, instead, an 
outright deletion of it.158 
What follows, then, is a need for a solution. As referenced at 
the outset of this Note, the proposed solution primarily focuses on 
1) limiting the discretionary powers of an equity receiver and 2) 
transforming the standard of review for receivership actions from 
the more deferential “abuse of discretion” to the more exacting 
“strict scrutiny” whenever receivership action is alleged to have 
violated a constitutional right.159  
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. 
 156. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (“[T]here has been a failure 
of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure 
adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to 
be bound by it.”). 
 157. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (arguing that the Complete 
Bar Order, when used in a securities fraud context, violates due process). 
 158. See Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(affirming Complete Bar Order “based upon, relating to, or arising out of the 
Settled Claims, the Action or the settlement of this Action,” stating they were 
“permanently barred, enjoined and restrained permanently from commencing, 
prosecuting, or asserting any such claim.”); Final Bar Order, SEC v. Stanford Int’l 
Bank, Ltd., No. 3:09-cv-0298-n (N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 30, 2016) (affirming Complete 
Bar Order “anywhere in the world . . . from . . . instituting, reinstituting, 
intervening in, initiating, commencing, maintaining, continuing, filing . . . or 
otherwise prosecuting [the settling party].”). 
 159. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (proposing heightened 
scrutiny of receivership actions); supra note 93 and accompanying text (proposing 
that the powers afforded an equity receiver dangerously disregard constitutional 
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Before modifying the existing standards of review on 
receivership action, however, courts must refocus on statutory 
limitations, thereby giving the PSLRA more persuasive power over 
the equitable decision-making of courts supervising 
receiverships.160 The PSLRA is specific to securities fraud class 
action litigation, and, consequentially, its Bar Order Provision 
should govern all bar orders issued by a court supervising such 
litigation, whether or not a receiver is involved.161 In that context, 
therefore, a bar order should only apply to non-settling 
co-defendants and their claims of contribution, indemnification 
and subrogation.162 This effectively limits bar orders to 
co-defendants, and does not extend to non-parties to a case.163 It 
also works to satisfy the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which 
mandates that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest.”164 All other forms of the bar order, and, 
more particularly, the Complete Bar Order, would be 
automatically invalidated as improper equitable remedies in a 
securities fraud litigation.165 
A return to traditional PSLRA jurisprudence aside, the 
solution, most importantly, requires an adjustment to the way we 
view equity receivership powers and the standard of review they 
deserve by reviewing courts. How then, should the discretionary 
powers of the equity receivership be limited? 
                                                                                                     
rights that may be at risk). 
 160. See infra note 163 (discussing the superiority of law over equity). 
 161. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) 
(2012) (“The provisions of this subsection shall apply in each private action 
arising under this chapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 162. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Ruttenberg, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220 (N.D. Ala. 
2004) (holding that the bar could permissibly extinguish claims which could be 
reasonably asserted by co-defendants, and this did not violate the co-defendants 
substantive due process rights); In re Heritage Bond Litig., 546 F.3d at 676 (“[In 
a PSLRA case], a bar order issued in a partial settlement of a securities fraud 
class action case cannot bar independent claims.”). 
 163. See FDIC v. Geldermann, Inc., 975 F.2d 695, 698–99 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(determining in a PSLRA case that non-parties could not fall under the bar order). 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1). 
 165. See generally In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 
2009) (citing TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916, 928 (10th Cir.1994) to affirm, under 
the PSLRA, that independent damage claims cannot be barred). 
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The equity receiver, as an officer of the court (and, by 
extension, a state actor), must be limited by the Constitution in its 
administration of an estate in securities fraud litigation.166 The 
governmental interest in permitting the discretionary powers of an 
equity receiver to include the ability to bar all claims, present or 
potential, against a certain party does not outweigh the interest of 
injured parties in preserving their constitutionally-protected right 
to a remedy and open access to the courts.167 
Any limitation on equity receivership powers is illusory if the 
courts are not able to void receivership actions in accordance with 
these limitations.168 Accordingly, the court supervising an equity 
receivership (the district court) should more actively apply a 
constitutional litmus test to all receivership actions to determine 
whether the actions are actually an abuse of discretion, because 
this constitutes a “serious procedural irregularity.”169 If, indeed, a 
constitutional issue presents itself (i.e., complainants allege a 
violation of their right to sue), the state interest in deferring to 
                                                                                                     
 166. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . , shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 167. The interests in granting such rights exist in equity. Considering the 
general supremacy of law over equity and the explicit supremacy of the 
Constitution over any and all other considerations (in law or equity), both the 
Constitution and the PSLRA preempt equity receivership action that cuts against 
both their express and implied protections. See id. (containing The Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2012) (“The 
provisions of this subsection shall apply in each private action arising under this 
chapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis added). See generally Temple v. Cleve Her Many 
Horses, 163 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.S.D. 2016) (stating the general rule that resort to 
equity is only permissible where there is no satisfactory result at law); Cayne v. 
Wash. Tr. Bank, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (D. Idaho 2015) (same); Trs. of Univ. of 
Penn. v. St. Jude Children’s Research Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 2d 518 (E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(same); Finnegan v. Suntrust Mortg., 140 F. Supp. 3d 819 (D. Minn. 2013) (same); 
Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 79 F. Supp. 
3d 269 (D.D.C. 2015) (same). 
 168. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152–61 (1999) (“The upshot in 
terms of judicial review is some practical difference in outcome depending upon 
which standard is used.”). 
 169. See Buttram v. Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Health and Welfare 
Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying a “less deferential” version of 
abuse of discretion than the traditional, and more deferential version of that 
standard of review, where plaintiff could prove “serious procedural irregularity” 
and “serious breach of . . . trustee’s fiduciary duty”). 
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receivership discretion should yield to the more compelling state 
interest in protecting fundamental rights; after all, an “obligation 
to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity 
marks its outer limit.”170 
In turn, appellate courts should apply a more scrutinizing 
standard of review to all decisions made by a trial court 
supervising an equity receivership where, on appeal, an 
infringement of the constitutional right to sue has been pleaded.171 
Analogizing the equity receiver to an administrative agency, 
rather than to a trustee, works to make this proposed heightened 
standard (“strict scrutiny”)172 not only acceptable, but timely.173 
The analogy of a receiver to a trustee falls short because the 
trustee’s power arises from a trust instrument, while an equity 
receiver’s power originates from court instruction.174 As a result, 
                                                                                                     
 170. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
 171. Because the matter is whether a constitutional right has been violated 
by the Complete Bar Order, one could reasonably find the question to be solely a 
matter of law and not one of discretion, particularly because the receiver, as 
proposed, would not have the discretion to violate the Constitution. The 
settlement agreement in question being a private agreement between aggrieved 
parties, the court’s decision to issue a Complete Bar Order in conjunction with 
that agreement would constitute a legal conclusion as to the agreement’s 
constitutionality—thereby meriting de novo review. See Highmark Inc. v. All Care 
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014) (“Traditionally, decisions on 
‘questions of law’ are ‘reviewable de novo,’ decisions on ‘questions of fact’ are 
‘reviewable for clear error,’ and decisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are ‘reviewable 
for abuse of discretion.’” (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988))). 
This Note, however, proposes a middle ground. See supra notes 133–144 and 
accompanying text (analogizing the receivership action to agency action by which 
a substantive due process violation has been alleged, and proposing strict scrutiny 
to such actions). 
 172. See Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL U. L. SCH.—LEGAL INFO. INST. (WEX 
DICTIONARY), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last updated June 
2016) (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (“To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must 
have passed the law to further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ and must 
have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 173. Compare supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (analogizing equity 
receiverships to administrative agencies, where equity receiverships are dictated 
by the court instructions and administrative agencies are dictated by the statutes 
creating them), with supra note 63 and accompanying text (analogizing and 
comparing receivers and trustees). 
 174. See supra note 69–70 and accompanying text (describing the analogy 
between the court instruction given to receivers and the trust instrument directed 
to trustees). 
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the receiver’s actions constitute state action—and are capable of 
violating the Due Process clauses of the Constitution—while a 
trustee’s actions do not.175 
When an administrative agency, on the other hand, is alleged 
to have violated substantive due process, that agency’s actions are 
subject to strict scrutiny by the reviewing court.176 In this regard, 
the agency is more analogous to the equity receiver, and a similar 
standard of review should be applied to such receivership action.177 
VIII. Conclusion 
While toiling to bring to life his new creation, Victor 
Frankenstein found himself learning from his mistakes and 
improving on past attempts. He said: 
The materials at present within my command hardly appeared 
adequate to so arduous an undertaking, but I doubted not that 
I should ultimately succeed. I prepared myself for a multitude 
of reverses; my operations might be incessantly baffled, and at 
last my work be imperfect, yet when I considered the 
improvement which every day takes place in science and 
mechanics, I was encouraged to hope my present attempts 
would at least lay the foundations of future success.178 
Much like “science and mechanics,”179 the law has a profound 
ability to correct itself.180 While the bar order has evolved in 
                                                                                                     
 175. See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text (calling an equity 
receiver a state actor because of its relationship to the court). 
 176. See Sw. Cmty. Action Council, Inc. v. Cmty. Servs. Admin., 462 F. Supp 
289, 296 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (“A regulation that significantly interferes with the 
exercise of a fundamental right requires rigorous scrutiny and must be supported 
by a compelling interest and be closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” 
(citing Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 262–63 (1975))); United States 
v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 789 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[S]trict scrutiny 
requires that a statute or regulation ‘be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest in order to survive’ a constitutional challenge.”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 63. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 593, 596 (1965) 
(“[P]rocesses exist for correcting and modifying bad statute law in the light of 
experience . . . .” (reviewing FREDERICK G. KEMPIN, JR., LEGAL HISTORY: LAW AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1963))).  
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securities fraud class action lawsuits to include the ability to 
permanently enjoin all parties—even non-parties—from 
exercising their respective rights to remedy, the proposed solutions 
can work to bring the bar order back down to its acceptable levels 
and limits.181 In this regard, the Constitution and PSLRA work to 
provide “the foundations of future success.”182 
With these three mechanisms in place—a return to traditional 
PSLRA jurisprudence in securities fraud litigation; a 
constitutional limitation on the equity receiver as a state actor; 
and strict scrutiny review at the district and appellate levels—the 
Complete Bar Order would disappear from the list of acceptable 
remedies in securities fraud litigation and settlement negotiations. 
The rights of plaintiffs to open access to the courts, whereby they 
might be able to seek an appropriate remedy for their injuries, 
would survive the challenges of a mercurial and undefined system 
of equity. These proposals would lead to a significant victory for 
the Constitution and the individual rights that it was designed to 
protect. 
                                                                                                     
 181. See supra notes 159–177 and accompanying text (providing solutions to 
the problems posed by current jurisprudence on the Complete Bar Order). 
 182. SHELLEY, supra note 1, at 63. 
